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to execute and city authorities and national 
governments have been unable to relocate the 
residents, dissuade sett lement, close the site, 
recognize residents’ illegal occupation of the 
land, or push through their own ambitious, 
urban redevelopment plans for the area. 
Almost all the Old Fadama residents are 
Ghanaians. Nearly three-quarters originate 
from the country’s northern regions, and 
about two-thirds are Muslim. In a 2009 
The 80,000 odd residents of Old Fadama, 
located about 3 kilometres from Accra’s central 
business district, live precarious lives. A Ghana 
High Court judgment in 2002 confi rmed they 
have no legal protection as illegal sett lers and 
that city authorities ‘are under no obligation to 
resett le or relocate or compensate [the residents] 
in any way before evicting them from their illegal 
occupations’ (Amnesty International, 2011). 
Yet the eviction order has proved impossible 
‘You Can Have It For God’: 
Mosque Building and the 
Production of Informal Citizenship 
and Property in Urban Africa
PAUL STACEY
Old Fadama in Accra, Ghana is home is some 80,000 people and the country’s 
largest informal sett lement. All buildings and sett lement in the densely populated 
site are also illegal following an eviction order against residents in 2002. Thus, 
not only are all without formal rights to the land, but the thousands of diff erent 
dwellings, buildings, shops and small businesses that make up the site openly defy 
the judicial decision as well as the will of city authorities and successive national 
governments. This article explores the residents’ mobilization to free up space for 
the construction of mosques inside the sett lement. In the absence of any overarching 
regulatory bodies, accessing and control of land proceed through a diverse range 
of ad hoc exchanges. Residents give up land they tenuously hold individually, 
contribute with diff erent resources, and voluntarily resett le in other areas of the 
sett lement, where they gain and enjoy the recognition of a broader community. 
Theoretically, the article contributes to new areas of urban research by showing 
how informal citizenship and property rights are made contemporaneously at the 
grassroots level through micro-level exchanges and processes of social recognition, 
and which take place entirely outside the reach of regulatory authorities and 
politico-legal institutions. In support, it exemplifi es that urban land-based 
developments are not only driven by urban policy agendas and formal state laws, 
but by their everyday, practical absence. This allows for ‘alternative’ temporal 
and spatial understandings of land and belonging to develop, which off set the 
precariousness of living in the informal and illegal sett lement.
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and fill in boggy areas with all kinds of 
waste and land fill. This results in severely 
clogged waterways and frequent flooding 
in Old Fadama as well as upstream parts 
of central Accra. The site and its immediate 
surroundings also experience substantial land, 
water, and air pollution from severe traffic 
congestion, open sewers, untreated land fill, 
the extensive burning of household waste, 
and the operations of thousands of unregu-
lated small industries, and mechanical work-
shops. 
In recent years, the adjacent site of Agbog-
bloshie has attracted global media attention 
as an expansive, toxic dumping ground for 
electronic waste imported from developed 
countries.1 The pressing and intertwined poli-
tical, legal, environmental and social challenges 
have contributed to a complex stalemate, as 
any improvements to the living standards 
of the ‘squatter’ settlement by government 
or city authorities would undermine the 
enumeration and survey, about 70 per cent 
expressed having no intentions to return 
to hometowns. Some 90 per cent of the 
population also considered Old Fadama their 
permanent home, about 8 per cent considered 
it their temporary home, and only 3 per cent 
comprised a mobile population (Housing 
the Masses, 2010). The population density 
of Accra as a whole is about 250 persons 
per hectare while in Old Fadama it is about 
ten times higher, making it one of the most 
densely populated sites in the capital, if not 
the country. It covers about 30 hectares and 
residents live mostly in self-built single-storey 
dwellings, where it is common for eight to 
ten people share a modest sized room. 
The settlement is roughly triangular and its 
spatial expansion is limited by a major truck 
road to the north (the Abose-Okai Road), and 
waterways on its west and east sides (the 
Odaw River and Korle Lagoon). Expansion is 
however possible as settlers raise riverbanks 
Figure 1. Shacks in Old Fadama. (Photo: Paul Stacey)
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of statutory regulations concerning land. It 
traces how they produce local rights to 
property and citizenship by giving up part 
of the land they occupy and gather material 
resources to build mosques: they swap self-
defined plots, move around and resettle in 
other parts of the settlement, and they con-
tribute with their labour and time. The overall 
objective is to free up space in the crowded 
settlement for the building of mosques for 
the enjoyment of a wider community. Their 
actions establish local norms and social 
recognition of land control, identity, and 
belonging, and socially embedded, informal 
relations of property and citizenship outside 
the reach of statutory institutions (Stacey, 
2019, p. 96). 
The process of transferring land and pro-
viding for mosque building changes residents’ 
judicial decision as well as risk encouraging 
others to squat. Thus, statutory authorities 
endeavour to stop settlement by holding back 
on basic public services and infrastructure. 
The stalemate means that formal governance 
is ‘suspended’ and there are no all-power-
ful institutions or organizations that con-
vincingly or uniformly control land distribu-
tion in Old Fadama. Yet even though authori-
ties refuse to recognize occupation rights, 
streams of rural–urban migrants continue 
to make Old Fadama their home and a rich 
mosaic of logics and practices have developed 
which shape land access, control, usage, and 
occupation (Stacey, 2018). 
This article explores the ways in which 
Old Fadama residents manage to offset the 
everyday uncertainty of living in the informal 
settlement and take advantage of the absence 
Figure 2. Recycling electronic equipment in Agbogbloshie. (Photo: CC Marlenenapoli)
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citizenship status to different formal rights 
such as political, civic, and social rights 
bestowed by statutory institutions and govern-
ments and which guarantee, for example, 
access to social systems and an impartial 
legal system. In turn, a productive social con-
tract develops as citizens are free to choose 
their own leaders, and they follow rules 
that define relations to the state and other 
citizens. This means that they shape the rules 
of the polity in which they become full members 
by delegating power to their formal repre-
sentatives (Honneth, 1995; Marshall, 1950). 
Meanwhile, property is typically approached 
in historical and normative studies in terms 
of an absolute right of private ownership 
and as a title to a physical object of value 
that is recognized and defined by statutory 
institutions to make society effective and 
legible (Hornby et al., 2017; De Soto, 2000). Yet 
absolute ‘rights’ are rare because they mostly 
depend on relationships to a range of non-
statutory powers, which may be more or less 
supportive of any state endorsed rights. In an 
everyday capacity therefore, the actual status 
and worth of both citizenship and property 
rights for individuals is not only based on 
formal and codified criteria, but decided by 
a slew of non-state actors, institutions, and 
stakeholders, which to varying degrees may 
endorse, ignore, or dismiss different, formal 
rights in any given context. Hence, what 
often defines legal pluralist contexts, such 
as urban informal settlements, is that formal 
rights and status are less significant than the 
local socio-political and cultural contexts and 
relations they play out in. A key element of 
both citizenship and property is therefore 
the issue of recognition, which in turn, can 
contribute to the authority of the powers 
that recognize and shape social contracts in 
society (Lund, 2011). 
Thus, to comprehend actual relations of 
property and citizenship in Old Fadama, 
it is necessary to focus on everyday local 
exchanges, social interactions, and informal 
processes that translate claims to social recog-
nition and rights, and which relate to 
status from that of ‘illegal squatters’, which 
is how they are characterized by city govern-
ments, to active members of the community 
and local citizens who contribute to the 
development of the area. At the same time, 
their tenuous claims to land which are often 
based on individual negotiations and trans-
actions are improved through their participa-
tion. This is because their involvement results 
in a broader level of recognition from the 
wider community to settle, belong, and live 
in the settlement, thereby demonstrating the 
contemporaneous production of property and 
citizenship (Lund, 2016). Accordingly, the 
process of mosque building is not only about 
the mosques themselves but concerns the 
mobilization of different physical resources 
to establish immaterial resources of value 
that reduce uncertainty and insecurity. The 
process reflects an overlooked form of urban 
land dynamics at the local level that contrast 
with dominant depictions of urban land 
transitions in terms of pressing urban plans, 
public polices, and new land laws (Parnell, 
2016). In Old Fadama, it is more the de facto 
absence of ‘state’ and the ‘non-working’ of 
formal designs that act as key drivers for 
significant micro-level developments and 
land-based processes to take shape.
Citizenship and Property: 
Some Conceptual Perspectives
The process of mosque building demon-
strates how urban residents tackle long-term 
processes of social, political, and economic 
marginalization – processes that have become 
a mainstay of research about urban dynamics 
in the developing world (Satt erthwaite and 
Mitlin, 2014). Specifi cally, a key contribution 
of the article is to exemplify the interconnected-
ness and contemporaneousness of the in-
formal production of urban citizenship and 
property and, thereby, the shaping of the 
local and ‘micro’ (non-statutory) state as in-
herently developmental and progressive 
(Parnell and Robinson, 2012). 
State-centred analysis typically relates 
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The building of mosques in Old Fadama 
demonstrates productive and beneficial land-
based developments that are not based on 
formal state law or individual, private property 
titles, as conventional wisdom purports, and 
attest plainly to the ineffectiveness of statutory 
institutions to enforce statutory rights in 
densely populated urban sites (Hornby et 
al., 2017; Stacey, 2019). The broad range of 
individuals involved are not explicitly creating 
institutions of ownership or belonging, or 
rights to citizenship or property. Nor are they 
actively recognizing or gaining explicit recog-
nition from any over-arching land-based 
authority. But involvement in the process 
shapes social recognition and informal ‘rights’ 
based around consensus and common interests. 
The ‘rights’ do not coagulate into clear 
understandings of ‘ownership’ or land-based 
authority but nevertheless are expressions 
of collective will that oppose the will of 
statutory institutions. The accumulation of 
efforts towards mosque building accordingly 
define local norms, interests, and rights. These 
limit the ability and legitimacy of statutory 
institutions to exercise their will and enforce 
the rights they want to recognize. 
In a broader perspective, the analysis aims 
to contribute to emerging areas of conceptuali-
zation to help inform a theoretical shift in 
urban studies away from dominant under-
standings, where the focus is often on ‘what 
is missing’, and where assessments of the 
Global South are measured against Western 
developmental trajectories (Locatelli and 
Nugent, 2009). Thus, urban land dynamics 
in the Global South are often depicted in 
terms of omnipresent market mechanisms, 
and market and investment driven forces, 
under often ill-defined neoliberal influences, 
over which marginalized groups have little 
control (Steel et al., 2017). 
There are two dimensions of mosque build-
ing of interest here. First, the processes of social 
recognition effectively offset the broader, 
market-based forces of urban development 
as well as diverse physical-legal mechanisms 
including privatization drives, gentrification, 
community-based efforts to offset un-
certainty, insecurity, and to establish a sense 
of belonging. Social actions produce (and 
deny) rights and ‘rights subjects’ as actors 
recognize the claims of others and, thereby, 
shape the norms of the community they become 
a part of (Isin and Turner, 2002; Stacey, 2019). 
Potential recognizers or deniers of claims, that 
may or may not become socially recognized 
rights, include neighbours, acquaintances, 
friends and adversaries, family, religious 
leaders, elders, chiefs, local government 
officials, parliamentarians, patrons, informal 
public service providers, local NGOs, chari-
ties, traders, small businesses. 
Mosque building is an expression of hard-
pressed communities overcoming challenges 
that stem from living under the shadow of 
illegality. It reflects the significance of local 
over national citizenship, and how local 
logics of ‘rights’ are produced that are more 
meaningful than statutory designs. It pro-
duces powerful material images in the form 
of well-kept concrete buildings, and offers 
effective, everyday reminders that residents 
have contributed significantly and positively 
to the shaping of their own physical land-
scape, thereby giving meaning to the place 
where they live. 
On the one hand, the mosques contribute 
to everyday ideas that Old Fadama is just 
like any other part of the ‘normal’ city, and 
they help soften otherwise sharp distinctions 
between the ‘developed city’ and the decrepit 
‘illegal’ and shabby settlement. But on the 
other, the mosques demonstrate what local 
people are capable of with little ‘outside’ 
support. This reproduces local ideas of Old 
Fadama as a unique place, based on local 
‘alternative’ logics, and ‘can-do’ ability and 
resourcefulness. Participation in the process 
of mosque building, however modest, signals 
support to the claims of others of the right to 
live there. Subsequently, the micro-level land 
exchanges and negotiations around mosque 
building translate to socially embedded local 
citizenship and reflect informal relations of 
property.
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and fl ows of knowledge to and from urban 
sett ings often direct migrants to the cheapest 
housing and informal work opportunities. 
Other push and pull forces to such sett le-
ments include the long-term withdrawal of 
the state from the public sphere, and political 
disinterest in social housing following the 
neoliberal turn from the mid 1980s. Further, 
large-scale entrepreneurs and investors have 
long preferred high-end housing and many 
African cities have for decades experienced 
urban planning defi cits and mismanagement. 
The cumulative eff ect is that streams of 
seasonal and permanent rural–urban migrants 
end up living and working in informal sett le-
ments where shelter, dwellings, and busi-
nesses etc. are built on land that formally 
belongs to others.3 As Africa’s population 
doubles to about 1.3 billion people by 2050, 
the number of rural–urban migrants who live 
in areas that lack the most basic of services 
is also expected to rise (UN Habitat, 2011).4 
Meanwhile, governments experience pres-
sure to develop and ‘normalize’ informal and 
illegal settlements from multiple sources, in-
cluding urban residents’ increased access to 
social media, and increases in local, national, 
and global NGOs that take up urban dimen-
sions of the Millennium Developments Goals 
(MDG) and, more recently, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG). All call parlia-
mentarians to account and have meant that 
any large-scale evictions or heavy-handed 
treatment of ‘squatters’ risk political backlash 
and criticism from numerous angles. Many 
African governments have, at least on paper, 
moved away from eviction rhetoric following 
pledges made at global events such as the 
2004 World Urban Forum in Barcelona, the 
2006 World Urban Forum in Vancouver, and 
commitments to agendas including the MDGs 
and SDGs. Nevertheless, although these agree-
ments may increase African governments’ 
international standing and legitimacy, they 
do not in themselves solve the challenges 
of governing areas where land is occupied 
against the wishes of landowners 
and eviction, which are recognized as failing 
to consider the interests of marginalized 
groups or simply negate local level agency 
(Van Noorloos et al., 2018; Gillespie, 2016). 
Second, the centrality of local agency, social 
recognition, and cooperation between diverse 
groups of stakeholders that gel into local 
rights, defying dominant explanations of in-
formal settlements and slum dwellings as 
resource-weak, relatively unchanging, violence 
prone, and as occupied by the losers of 
globalization processes (Davis 2006; Mohanty 
2006; Shabane et al., 2011). 
The article is based on qualitative data 
collected over nine visits to Old Fadama from 
July 2014 to July 2016, totalling nearly six 
months. Over twenty semi-structured inter-
views, and many more informal conversa-
tions, were carried out with a range of stake-
holders, including residents, community and 
religious leaders, and participants in mosque 
building. This was supported with ethno-
graphic observation, daily visits to the settle-
ment, and numerous informal conversations 
with residents.2 The following sections provide 
a background for the informalization of land 
control in Accra, an outline of Old Fadama, 
a description of land control in Ghana and 
in Old Fadama. Then, the empirical sections 
focus on the process of building mosques, and 
the socio-moral economy of land exchanges. 
The main arguments are drawn together in a 
concluding section. 
Drivers of Informal Sett lements 
As is the case with many other sub-Saharan 
African countries, Ghana experiences a steady 
growth of urban populations as a result of 
rural–urban migration, which in turn leads 
to increasing numbers taking up residence in 
all kinds of informal and illegal sett lements 
dott ed around cities. There are many drivers 
of rural–urban migration to such low-end 
dwellings. Many African countries experience 
a lack of viable employment in rural areas 
and a persistence of near-subsistence levels of 
agricultural production. And social networks 
418 BUILT  ENVIRONMENT   VOL  44   NO  4
URBAN LAND GRABS IN AFRICA
Generally, the stalemate is characterized by 
city authorities and governments pursuing 
contradictory objectives.7 However, in an 
everyday sense, the role of state institutions 
in the area today appears limited to uphold-
ing an absolute minimum of public health, 
safety, and public order standards, discourag-
ing settlement, and communicating that settle-
ment is illegal. The absence of statutory insti-
tutions and public service provision in the 
area is evident in the lack of planned infra-
structure such as public spaces, roads, traffic 
lights, pavements, health clinics, post office, 
state schools, public buildings, street names, 
and house numbers etc. (Stacey and Lund, 
2016). As a result, Old Fadama exemplifies a 
decades long process of statutory institutions 
effectively retreating from public life, and 
city and national governments failing to 
meet even the most basic of needs, with 
marginalized communities left to their own 
devices (Chatterjee, 2004). In the different 
sites of illegal and informal settlements 
around Accra however, people generally do 
not expect or anticipate the ‘state’ to come 
along and improve on their living standards. 
This means that necessary improvements 
in everyday life stem predominantly from 
micro-level relations and initiatives, rather 
than the fulfilment of lofty objectives by 
governments as proposed by global develop-
mental agendas. 
Land Control in Ghana and in Old Fadama 
Similar to many former British colonies, land 
issues in Ghana revolve around relation-
ships between and within two broad land 
systems. One comprises customary and tradi-
tional institutions which control about 80 per 
cent of Ghana land, which is typically 
acquired through membership of a lineage 
or community, through ethnic citizenship, 
and relations to customary authorities. The 
other system derives from the introduction 
of English common law by the British col-
onial power, which recognizes individual 
ownership and pursues the formalization 
Old Fadama: A Brief Background
Sett lement in Old Fadama is traceable to 
Hausa and other migrants who established 
peri-urban villages around Accra from the 
late nineteenth century (Acquah, 1958).5 And 
since the colonial period, diff erent govern-
ments have had a series of ambitious, yet 
altogether unfulfi lled developmental plans 
for the area. Steep population growth is 
traceable to the late 1980s, and many narra-
tives from long-term residents pinpoint this 
period as key to understanding the myriad 
developmental challenges the sett lement faces 
today (Interview, 29 July 2014). Besides the 
structural drivers of rural–urban migration, 
since the early 1990s the increase in popu-
lation is att ributable to specifi c events. These 
include decongestion exercises undertaken 
by city authorities in other areas of Accra in 
connection with a Non-Aligned Movement 
Conference in 1991; government permission 
given to a temporary yam market in Old 
Fadama in 1993; and a series of ethnic con-
fl icts in the north of the country that cul-
minated in 1994 (Gillespie, 2013, pp. 160–163; 
Stacey, 2015). 
In the Accra metropolitan area only 15 per 
cent of the population have direct access to a 
sewer system, and nearly 40 per cent of the 
population, or over 1.6 million people, live 
in slum conditions where a lack of adequate 
sanitation is one of the most serious concerns 
(Diener et al., 2014; UN Habitat, 2011). The 
jurisdiction of the Accra Metropolitan 
Authority (AMA) covers some seventy-
eight slums of different sizes with nearly 
half (thirty-four), defined as having either 
‘insecure’ or ‘no’ land tenability.6 Following 
the 2002 eviction notice served by the AMA, 
and which residents have failed to overturn, 
the position of different levels of government 
towards the settlement has tended to vacillate 
between begrudging accepting, confrontation, 
and increased interest at election times when 
the need for party political support means 
that pressure to move eases and resource 
flows may increase. 
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stakeholders. In short, Old Fadama reflects 
an extreme case of a failure of both statutory 
institutions, and state-recognized customary 
(Ga) institutions, to exercise convincingly 
their authority over an urban land area. 
However, the relative absence of the two 
dominant systems and any universal rules 
does not mean Old Fadama is not governed, 
ungovernable, or a no-man’s land. On the 
contrary, the manoeuvres of each of the domi-
nant land-controlling systems goes hand-in-
hand with micro-level dynamics involving 
a plethora of other actors, interests, and 
powers, which step in and create their own 
norms and mechanisms to secure land. For 
example, new categories of ethnic Dagomba 
‘chief’ have emerged and successfully carved 
out informal jurisdictions, and now function 
as land-distributing powers in some areas 
of the settlement, and these may or may 
not follow Ga customs. There is therefore a 
wide variability and fluidity of land dealings 
and logics, which reflect a kaleidoscope of 
different relations, rationales, and resources, 
but which share the objectives of securing 
control of land and establishing facts on the 
ground. Different interests make and unmake 
their own informal relations of property with 
the resources they have at their disposal. This 
means that different groups of people may 
comply to different sets of rules and norms to 
substantiate their tenuous claims to the land, 
and different buildings in the settlement may 
enjoy recognition from different parties and 
be based on different logics (Stacey, 2018). 
Moreover the illegality of settlement means 
there is no formal, state recognized docu-
mentation for any of the thousands of ad hoc 
constructions on the site, although some 
developers do endeavour to introduce ele-
ments of formality into building processes 
in order to substantiate their claims to the 
land.8 Nevertheless, the legitimacy of any 
documentation, be it social or formal or 
written, can change, and there is often un-
certainty over who controls what piece of 
land and on what basis. As such, the process 
of establishing local rights to land is rarely 
of land titling. About 20 per cent of all land 
is formally under the latt er system and the 
control of statutory institutions. However, it 
is widely acknowledged that both Ghana’s 
land administration systems are cumbersome 
due to the involvement of numerous statutory 
and non-statutory institutions. These often 
have overlapping and competing jurisdictions 
and pursue diff erent bureaucratic and 
administrative procedures. Thus, formal state 
and customary laws att aining to land access 
are often circumvented, and the fundaments 
of both systems are often not eff ectively or 
consistently enforced, making land related 
contestation and litigation common (Ayee et 
al., 2011, pp. 7–8; GoG, 2011, p. 2). 
Old Fadama is part of a much larger land 
area under the customary control of the Ga 
ethnic group, for whom the land is sacred. 
However, their traditional authority over Old 
Fadama has eroded steadily since the colonial 
period due to competition with governments 
and encroachment. As different governments 
have come and gone, the occupation and 
expansion of settlement, together with illegal 
building, continues to be a cause of grievance 
and annoyance for leading Ga, who see it 
as an affront to their customary authority 
(Grant, 2006; Interview, 7 August 2014). In 
efforts to establish control, Ga traditional 
authorities have representatives in Old 
Fadama who endeavour to keep check on 
the land exchanges that take place. They 
regularly scout around the site to identify 
new building projects and to persuade 
small-scale developers that the land they 
build on actually belongs to the Ga, and that 
developing the land carries an obligation to 
make a customary payment. However, they 
lack the resources to enforce their demands 
and it is not unusual for their requests for 
homage and recognition to be rejected. 
Divisions within different Ga clans further 
undermine their authority over the land. 
This means that the role of Ga customary 
authorities in regulating land access in Old 
Fadama is limited, and they may experience 
competition from other, more powerful local 
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They look solid, and sport minarets with 
balconies and speakers used to call people 
to prayer. They plainly stand apart from 
the surrounding ramshackle dwellings and 
kiosks built mostly from timber and ply-
wood. Spaces outside the large mosques 
serve as meeting places, and inside, the floors 
are typically covered with prayer mats and 
carpets. The large prayer spaces are about 
half the size of a tennis court and allow for 
a hundred or so people to congregate. They 
serve primarily as sites of prayer up to five 
times a day but also as community centres, 
as well as casual places to meet, chat, and 
hang out, and where the open doors and 
windows offer respite from the heat of the 
day. Each mosque has its own mallam (a 
Muslim religious teacher) and a committee 
under the Chief Iman. 
One resident who had participated in the 
building of a mosque explained that the 
process normally starts with a motion put 
forward by an individual or a small group 
to the effect that they want to build in such 
and such a place and the idea is then com-
municated to the congregation at prayer 
times. The illegality of settlement means there 
are no formal regulatory bodies or urban 
plans to comply with. The biggest challenges 
are thus the overall shortage of space for new 
buildings, the mobilization of materials, and 
the gaining of local support. Improvisatory 
committees are set up to organize fund raising 
activities, identify potential donors, donation 
collectors, and target sympathetic local 
businesses for material support. However, 
a mallam explained that monetary collections 
take place mainly within the settlement itself 
so not to unduly upset or draw too much 
attention from city authorities, and com-
munity leaders spoke of care taken about 
which political figures they approach for 
donations and support. It is normal that the 
initiators of a new mosque occupy part of the 
land they wish it to be built on, or at least 
live close by. Before sharing their idea with 
a mallam they would already have talked 
to neighbours, gained some backing for the 
complete. It can wax and wane as it is 
influenced by the fluidity of the surrounding 
social and political landscape. 
 The Mosques and the Building Process 
In Old Fadama there are numerous mosques 
of diff erent shapes, sizes, and designs. At 
least fi fteen are prominent enough to defi ne 
public places and mark out localities. Count-
less other smaller places used for prayer 
are less conspicuous to the casual observer. 
Some take the form of a smooth, fl at slab of 
concrete a few metres square with nothing 
other than a surrounding low wall to mark 
their signifi cance. Others resemble ad hoc 
shelters or places to rest with plastic prayer 
mats rolled out on the bare earth under 
parasols. Close by, plastic kett les of water 
lined up for washing feet before entering 
reveal these are also places of prayer. The 
lack of documentation, the informality of 
land occupation and resource exchanges, 
and the diversity of logics that infl uence 
land access and control, make it diffi  cult to 
quantify accurately the number of people 
involved in building the larger mosques 
(see fi gure 3). However, anecdotal evidence 
from diverse stakeholders holds that at least 
‘a dozen or so’ households are involved in 
giving up land, and ‘many, many others’ 
participate and support the construction in 
other ways. Clearly, it is especially the large 
mosques, which contribute to the landscape 
and skyline, add aesthetic value to the area 
and refl ect local agency (Amin and Cirolia, 
2018). From the data collection, there was no 
evidence that the mosques or their religious 
leaders enjoyed a higher level of protection or 
tolerance than other buildings or stakeholders 
in the sett lement, as all constructions are 
formally illegal. But at the same time, it can-
not be ruled out that the cultural and symbolic 
capital enjoyed and produced by religious 
organizations may translate to a level of tacit 
recognition that others do not enjoy. 
The larger mosques are built from concrete 
blocks, and painted white, green, and brown. 
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the workings of the vibrant land markets that 
also characterize Old Fadama and where the 
increase in population and lack of space has 
pushed up land prices for all kinds of rented 
accommodation and shelter. There are, how-
ever, risks connected with selling land, space, 
or buildings, because there are often multiple 
claimants to the same self-defi ned areas. 
Disputes can fl are up and claiming a right 
over the land risks contestation. Thereby, 
giving up a piece of land for a symbolic fee to 
a religious organization, or giving part of the 
land one occupies for nothing, can remove 
the risk of land-related contentions amongst 
multiple claimants, associated with living 
‘illegally’. 
Volunteers go around the settlement and 
collect donations while all kinds of other re-
sources are mobilized: voluntary labour, local 
expertise and knowledge, and various building 
materials. Labour is organized and the build-
idea, and formulated notions about what 
needs to be done. 
Gaining the necessary support can 
take several years but is a process which 
itself contributes to a sense of community 
ownership and determination. As a mallam 
explained: 
Some people come out boldly to donate land 
but the situation now is that gett ing the land is 
diffi  cult, and we have to do a lot of talking with 
others to get it.
The Socio-Moral Economy 
of Land Exchanges
Giving up a small piece of occupied space 
is not considered an important decision, but 
regarded as straightforward and rational, 
contributing to the work of God, improving 
the neighbourhood, and utilizing space. The 
social economy of land stands in contrast to 
Figure 3. One of the many mosques in Old Fadama (Photo: Paul Stacey) 
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plywood shack to claim a newly created 
space, or may use the opportunity to block 
off an ‘annoying’ ‘public’ path to stop it 
becoming well-trodden and more intrusive. 
In yet other instances, residents mobilize to 
remove abandoned vehicles and heaps of 
garbage that pile up in unclaimed spots. All 
such processes free up space in the heavily 
populated site and contribute to its gradual 
(re)spatialization and rebuilding that often 
renders redundant previous ‘demarcations’ 
of space, and self-defined plots. All are 
expressions of micro-level processes of claim 
and right making which contribute to the 
myriad, informal relations of property and 
sense of belonging. 
A mallam explained an ideal situation is 
when word comes through a large family 
living together plan to return to their home 
town. Someone from the mosque will then 
try and bargain a low price and persuade the 
family on religious and community grounds. 
The plot is then taken over by the mosque 
and levelled to make way for the new con-
struction. Common themes of discussion con-
cerning land issues in Old Fadama include the 
realizations that ‘we are all squatters here’, 
‘this land does not belong to us’, ‘no-one 
has the right to call themselves the owner of 
this land’, and ‘one day we will all be evicted’. 
These understandings present religious leaders 
with opportunities to take over contested, 
abandoned, and ‘free’ space and ‘claim it 
for everyone and God’ (Interview, 21 January 
2016). Meanwhile, relative apathy regarding 
profit can stem from an awareness that 
mosques have few resources of their own 
and rely solely on public support. The 
combination of illegality, insecurity, and the 
moral authority of religious leaders therefore 
contributes to a sense that it is better to 
donate land to a religious organization, or at 
least to sell it cheaply, and increase the degree 
of social recognition one enjoys, than to try 
and sell at a high profit and risk contestation. 
The relative disinterest in profit maximization 
in relation to transferring land for mosque 
building is also influenced by where people 
ing phases are planned and scheduled. Local 
producers of cement blocks are contacted 
and encouraged to donate an amount they 
can afford, and other builders’ merchants 
are contacted to donate, to sell at cost price, 
or to provide materials at a discount. In this 
way the physical materials: cement, bricks, 
concrete, timber, steel, paint, windows and 
doors etc. are accumulated, as are the necessary 
human resources: bricklayers, builders, plaster-
ers, painters, carpenters, electricians, and 
plumbers, who are encouraged to offer a 
couple of days free labour. The limited level 
of formal employment, the strong social base 
of neighbourhoods, the high levels of under-
employment and casual labour, and the wide-
spread understanding of insecurity and that 
‘we have to do things for ourselves here’ act 
as drivers that mobilize the necessary materials 
and resources. One resident explained: 
If they need cement or blocks it will be 
announced at the Friday prayers. They will say 
we want to buy this and that. Anybody who 
wishes to can give a gift to God. Go and get what 
you want to bring and what you want to give us, 
as we need it now! Maybe somebody will say 
‘Oh, I’m a block moulder. How much do you 
want?’ And when it comes to the pillars, they 
will say, we need this and that to make them, 
and if you wish you can come and give to God. 
Somebody will say I can supply this and this. 
Accordingly, mosque building relies on 
the ability of participants to open up and 
claim pace successfully. There are no plots as 
such, but irregular, self-defined spaces used 
erecting shelters and kiosks. These are mostly 
between 10 and 20 square metres and are 
often wedged between existing ad hoc structures. 
These and larger spaces may however 
increase in the event of fire and flood, which 
are common, leading to razed buildings, 
destruction, abandoned plots, and damage to 
surrounding shacks. Badly made shelters fall 
quickly into disrepair, and occupiers may not 
have the resources or inclination to rebuild, 
and occupiers may make the decision to 
move their home towns. Neighbours may eye 
an opportunity to extend their own shelters 
by a half metre of so, put up a ‘temporary’ 
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dedness of land exchanges, as it cannot pro-
ceed without agreement between stakeholders. 
To exemplify one instance of the process, one 
informant spoke of how proud he was to give 
up a piece of land for ‘almost nothing’, which 
he had lived and built on for many years, 
reasoning: 
If you give up the land, when you pray and put 
your forehead on that land God will bless you 
more. And if you pray tomorrow, the reward is 
[there] for you. (Interview, 21 January 2016)
The giving up of land is therefore an 
individual moral and religious investment 
that translates to a social undertaking that 
establishes community-based ties to the land 
and community membership. He continued: 
A Muslim who does not pray regularly with 
others in a mosque, but alone in a room, will die 
alone and be buried in the clothes he is wearing. 
Nobody will come and touch you, or bathe you, 
and that is dirtiness. But [if] he is praying [with 
others] they will fi nd a way to bathe him and 
put him into the white cloth, but when they are 
not seeing you in the mosque anytime, anything 
can happen to you, and nobody will come to 
help. It’s a very important place for Muslims that 
everybody should gather and pray together. If 
anything happens they will bear witness that that 
person is coming to the congregation. (Interview, 
8 December 2015)
Another resident explained his reasons for 
giving up land for a mosque as follows: 
You know, giving out your property in a 
community to build a mosque means you will 
fi nd a home in paradise. That’s why I gave up 
my wooden structure. Besides, praying in Islam 
is bett er than sleeping and is one of the pillars of 
Islam. Therefore, I cannot have a place to sleep 
where the Muslim community are not having a 
place for prayers. I have been in this community 
for the past 27 years. There is also ‘Zakat’ a pillar 
in Islam that states ‘give and it shall be given 
unto you’ so when you give you are purifi ed. In 
my tradition, I need to go back home before I die. 
If not, my death will be considered as bad. As 
you can see I’m old enough to go home now and 
not to stay here and die. If I die today, I will be 
sent to the mosque for the Imam to pray for me 
before I will be buried. A friend of mine, he also 
gave up his house here and gave the space for 
building a mosque. (Interview, 14 January 2016)
move. This is because besides the expense of 
moving, a family or individuals who return 
to the north of the country to rural home 
villages and ethnic home towns will be 
able to access land for free and their living 
expenses in rural areas will be considerably 
lower than in the capital. 
On other occasions neighbours will be 
encouraged to give up some of the space 
they occupy and shuffle their shacks 
closer together so that a mosque can be 
refurbished or expanded. This is a practice 
that is becoming more common due to the 
increasing difficulties of obtaining enough 
land for large constructions and adds to 
the physical restructuring of space. In other 
instances, a mallam may visit people and 
plead with them to move if their space is 
needed, and act as a mediator and help 
occupants find another space to move to. 
Because religious organizations are often able 
to mobilize much greater resources in the 
community than others, they can sometimes 
build in places that are otherwise deemed 
problematic and unsuitable. For instance, 
there are examples in Old Fadama of religious 
organizations successfully reclaiming and 
building on land that is otherwise prone to 
flooding and waterlogging and which have 
been abandoned by others. Such building 
projects are only possible because religious 
organizations can rally a relatively large vol-
untary workforce and mobilize the resources 
needed to raise the ground and make it 
suitable for building. 
The process of resettling in another part 
of Old Fadama is also a resource demanding 
activity for households and demands co-
ordination, planning, and support. It can involve 
carefully dismantling and saving timber from 
badly constructed wooden shacks that have 
typically been patched up for years, and then 
transporting the whole lot by hand-drawn 
barrows to a new site and putting the whole 
thing together again. Subsequently, the dis-
mantlement, movement, and re-assembling 
of dwellings and kiosks contributes to the 
(re)production of space and the social embed-
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The local relations of property and citizen-
ship emerge from what individuals actually 
do, what they contribute with, what they have 
given up, and what they achieve through 
active cooperation with others. New local 
subjectivities are produced as residents give 
up land they tenuously held individually and 
involve themselves in a broader process. They 
contribute with physical and non-physical 
resources, and some move to other areas of 
the settlement to make space available. Parti-
cipation defines local communities as achievers 
and as active agents who create their own 
urban landscape in ways that extend and 
improve social life (Margaretten, 2015, p. 
59). With this, participation in the non-insti-
tutionalized process can be construed as micro-
level efforts to use land to establish spatial 
justice, while the lingering legal prerogative 
surrounding the settlement deprives residents 
of secure land rights or meaningful citizen-
ship status. The currency of persuasion for 
obtaining land for mosque building is not 
legal paper work or definitive monetary value, 
but moral and social norms that help people 
overcome everyday, hard, social realities 
(Smart 2018; Wang 2018). Subsequently, 
involvement in mosque building is beneficial 
because it helps validate an individual’s own 
occupancy while signalling to others common 
decency. In turn, the broader community 
recognizes individual rights to settle and 
status as a local citizen, and the socially-
based exchanges of materials and resources 
give meaning to the place people live. 
Finally, the mosques that residents help 
produce provide social and moral authority 
for the community and reduce the uncertainty 
and insecurity that all share living in an 
urban environment against the will of city 
authorities and governments. Thereby, the 
different participants act as a loose, socio-
political body of underwriters for local rights, 
who validate their own actions that make it 
possible for the building of mosques. This 
means that the local economy of land related 
to mosque building is not dis-embedded from 
the surrounding society but is a central part 
Here we see an informal social contract 
between, on the one hand, community mem-
bers who have contributed with physical 
resources and recognize the social and moral 
authority of the mosques, and on the other, 
the non-physical resources they receive from 
the mosque in return, and which safeguard 
and protect the interests of the community. 
On a practical level, the mosques provide 
shelter for those who have nowhere to stay, 
and its leaders help solve all kinds of com-
munity disputes, while looking out for the 
welfare of the community. As one resident 
explained: 
The mosque that we just passed by, if I don’t 
go in today and they do not see me, and in the 
evening they also don’t see me, and the next day 
they don’t see me – then they will ask, ‘why was 
it we didn’t see you yesterday?’. If not the Imam, 
then those you normally pray with will ask you. 
Conclusion 
City authorities and successive governments 
have proved unable either to recognize or 
relocate the residents of Old Fadama, follow-
ing a 2002 eviction order, and a stalemate has 
taken hold where formal state land laws are 
ignored, customary control is renegotiated, 
and the fl ow of much needed resources from 
government is held back. The corollary is that 
land access, control, and usage proceed through 
a diverse range of ad hoc, micro-level nego-
tiations, exchanges, and contests. Hence, this 
article presents a case of urban development 
driven by the absence of coherent urban plan-
ning and regulation, and which has inadvert-
ently allowed for the emergence of ‘altern-
ative’ temporal and spatial understandings of 
land and belonging to develop. The article 
traces the process of cooperation and mobiliza-
tion of diff erent resources by residents that 
free up space for the construction of mosques. 
This exemplifi es the interconnectedness and 
contemporaneous making of citizenship and 
property rights at the local level through 
improvisatory micro-level exchanges, and 
processes of mutual, social recognition. 
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forms by the same author elsewhere (see Stacey 
2019; Stacey 2018; Stacey and Lund 2016). 
3. There are numerous definitions of informal 
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